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A Conceptual Model to Identify Intent to Use ChemicalBiological Weapons
Abstract
This paper describes a conceptual model to identify and interrelate indicators of intent of
non-state actors to use chemical or biological weapons. The model expands on earlier
efforts to understand intent to use weapons of mass destruction by building upon wellresearched theories of intent and behavior and focusing on a sub-set of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) to account for the distinct challenges of employing different types of
WMD in violent acts. The conceptual model is presented as a first, critical step in
developing a computational model for assessing the potential for groups to use chemical or
biological weapons.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss3/
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Introduction
Proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), most
commonly defined as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) devices are grave threats to United States (US) national security.1
Although several domestic and international terrorists and terrorist
groups have communicated their intent to acquire and use WMD
including nuclear weapons, explosives have been the weapon of choice.2
An ongoing concern is identifying indicators that an existing or emerging
terrorist group intends to expand its arsenal to include CBRN weapons.
The apparent preference for conventional weapons (explosives) by violent
groups is understandable. Explosives are a proven technology with known
outcomes, generally require only basic knowledge of chemistry and
relatively easy-to-obtain materials and instructions to manufacture, and
can be acquired through criminal and other networks. They have the
additional benefit of creating a significant visual and psychological impact
beyond damage or destruction of their target. In contrast, WMD are more
difficult to manufacture, acquire, and use, and their outcomes are less
certain.3 However, opportunities may arise that significantly reduce the
Although explosives have been included in some definitions of WMD, for example,
the definition used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation which includes any
explosive or incendiary (bomb, grenade, rocket having an explosive or incendiary
charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of
more than one-quarter ounce, mine of device similar to any of the devices described),
they are considered conventional weapons not requiring the same type of prohibitions
as CBRN for use in state-on-state armed conflicts. US Department of Defense, “Joint
Publication 1-02” in DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, vol. 14,
November 8, 2010 (as amended through February 15, 2016), (Arlington, VA: US
Department of Defense, 2010), available at:
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf; United Nations Security Council
Commission for Conventional Armaments: Resolutions Adopted by the Commission
at Its Thirteenth Meeting, August 12, 1948, and a Second Progress Report of the
Commission (New York, NY: United Nations, 1948), available at:
http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/332321?show=full; As quoted in United
Nations. 2012. The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965. UN Publication
A/67; L.28. New York, NY: United Nations Office of Public Information. US Congress,
“Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in 18 U.S.C. 2332a (Washington, D.C.: US
Government Publications Office, 2011); NSPD-17/HSPD 4, “National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 2002 (unclassified version),
available at: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html.
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Last modified 2017.
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs; Gary A.
Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies (London, UK: King’s College, 2014),
available at: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/more-bang-for-the-buckexamining-the-determinants-of-terrorist-adoption-of-new-weaponstechnologies(992afd2a-bdeb-46b2-8cb7-cd29d77ebd64).html; McCormick, “Terrorist
Decision Making,” 473-507.
3 James JF Forest, “Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism,”
Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (2012): 51, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=jss.
1
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challenges of acquiring WMD, such as discovery of a state actor’s cache of
chemical or biological weapons. For example, roadside bombs used
against US forces in Iraq in 2003 contained Iraqi-produced chemical
weapons abandoned after the Iran-Iraq war two decades earlier.4
The challenges WMD pose for non-state actors suggest that factors
different from those associated with conventional weapons are likely to
affect consideration of WMD as part of a terrorist group’s strategy. As
advances in science and technology further reduce obstacles to successful
execution of a WMD attack, it is increasingly important to understand why
a group would commit to acquisition or production and use of WMD and
what indicators would signal movement toward such a commitment.
Chemical and biological weapons are sufficiently different from
radiological and nuclear weapons to warrant separate analysis. For
example, compared with radiological and nuclear devices or weapons,
chemical and biological agents and weapons are easier to conceal, the
materials needed to produce them are relatively easier to acquire, and a
chemical or biological weapons (CBW) program requires less financing
and expertise to establish.5 The knowledge required to perform biological
and chemical science also shares more in common than that required for
radiological and nuclear science, which may have implications for
recruitment and efficient application of expertise. Like radiological or
nuclear weapons, even low concentrations of CBW can create panic and
fear.6 However, because discovery of a chemical, biological, or radiological
attack may not occur immediately, heightened panic and fear about the
spread of the agent or material can ensue.7 Previous analyses of attempts
to acquire or use CBW–while useful–have not resulted in a practical
framework to identify indicators that a group may present a high risk for

Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report
Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2016, accessed January 24, 2017.
5 NATIBO, “Biological Detection System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base
Study: A Primer on Biological Detection Technologies,” in Book Biological Detection
System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study: A Primer on Biological
Detection Technologies, (City: North American Technology and Industrial Base
Organization, 2001); Andrea A. Nehorayoff, Benjamin Ash, and Daniel S. Smith,
“Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts,” Journal of
Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 35-48, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1510&context=jss.
6 K. Ganesan, S.K. Raza, and R. Vijayaraghavan, “Chemical Warfare Agents,” Journal
of Pharmacy and Bioallied Sciences 2, no. 3 (2010): 166, available at:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148621/.
7 There is an incubation period for biological agents (G.G. Onishchenko et al.,
“Bioterrorism: A National and Global Threat,” Herald-Russian Academy of Sciences
C/C of Vestnik-Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk 73, no. 2 (2003): 127-35, as excerpted in
Appendix D of Proceedings of Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving
Responses: U.S. - Russian Workshop Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: The National
Academies Press (2004).
4
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acquiring and using CBW.8 This article presents a framework for CBW
intent–a CBW Intent Model.

Previous Use of CBW by Individuals and Groups
Chemical or biological weapons are not a recent phenomenon. As early as
1000 BC, the Chinese used arsenic smoke against enemies. Both World
Wars saw experimentation and use of chemical and biological weapons
(for example, WWI: Germany’s use of anthrax to infect Russian horses,
chlorine and mustard gas use by Germany early in the war and by Britain
late in the war; WWII: Japan’s experimentation with and use of cholera
and other biological agents against Chinese cities).9
With few exceptions, CBW also are generally not the sole weapon
considered by a group. Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect that
released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995, tried unsuccessfully to
acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons and researched other weapon
technologies such as lasers and microwaves while running chemical and
biological weapons programs.10 The arsenals of armed militia groups in
the United States have included both conventional weapons (for example,
assault rifles and bombs) and CBW (ricin by the Minnesota Patriots
Council; potassium cyanide by The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of
the Lord).11 Attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

Jerrold M. Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism:
Implications for Counterterrorist Policy,” in Contemporary Research on Terrorism,
eds. Paul C. Wilkinson and Alaisdair M. Stewart, (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen
University Press, 1987); Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The
Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk
for Terrorism,” Studies in conflict and terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 73-100, available
at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/105761002753502475; Jonathan
B. Tucker and J. Pate, “The Minnesota Patriots Council (1991),” in Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B.
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
9 Gerard J. Fitzgerald, “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War
I,” American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 4 (2008): 611-25, available at:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2376985/; Thomas J. Johnson, “A
History of Biological Warfare from 300 B.C.E. to the Present,” American Association
for Respiratory Care, available at:
http://www.zarcommedia.com/index.php/research-documents/13014.html; Jeffrey
K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, chap. 2, eds. Frederick R. Sidell,
Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz (Washington, D.C.: TMM Publications, 1997),
available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/ch2electrv699.pdf; C.N. Trueman, “Chemical Warfare and World War Two,” in The
History Learning Site, accessed May 30, 2016, available at:
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/chemical-warfare-andworld-war-two-2/.
10 David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use
of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000).
11 Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck; Tucker and Pate, “The Minnesota Patriots
Council (1991)”; Jessica E. Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord
8
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(ISIS) have included chlorine gas and mustard gas as well as advanced
conventional weapons (for example, assault rifles, surface-to-surface
rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided weapons).12
CBW are also often instrumental to achieving specific objectives for which
they are especially well-suited, such as targeting individuals or debilitating
but not necessarily killing victims. They have been used for both political
and criminal purposes. For example, ISIS used CW to slow down and
demoralize Iraqi forces advancing on Mosul, the Rajneeshees
contaminated food at several restaurants to affect the outcome of a local
election, VX agent was used to murder Kim Jong-Nam, a disgruntled
employee poisoned the food of his co-workers, and ricin was used to
murder a Bulgarian and in an attempt by an individual to poison a spouse
in a child custody battle.13
Although individuals have perpetrated many of the documented attacks
using chemical or biological (CB) agents, groups are the focus of the
model. So-called lone wolf attacks are more likely to have a criminal
purpose such as extortion or revenge and be one-time events.14 Groups are
more likely to have access to the resources needed to develop an organic
CB capability. Because groups have at least two members, there are also
more opportunities to observe indicators or trip wires such as expertise of
group members, intercept communications, or infiltrate the group.15
(1985),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
12 Raja Abdulrahim, “Islamic State Accused of New Chemical Weapons Attack in
Syria,” Wall Street Journal (2015), available at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-accused-of-using-chemical-weaponsin-syria-1440353562, “Conflict Armament Research, Dispatch from the Field: Islamic
State Weapons in Kobane” (London, UK: Conflict Armament Research LTD, 2015),
available at: http://www.conflictarm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Islamic_State_Weapons_in_Kobane.pdf; Schmitt, “ISIS
Used Chemical Arms”; Kristina Wong, “ISIS Used Chemical Weapons against the
Kurds, U.S. Officials Say,” The Hill (2016), available at:
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/269551-isis-used-chemical-weapons-against-thekurds-us-officials-say; Barbara Starr and Nicole Gaouette, “U.S. Bombs ISIS
chemical weapons plant,” CNN Report, September 13, 2016, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/13/politics/isis-chemical-weapons-plant/.
13 “Kim Jong-Nam death: Two women charged with murder,” BBC News.com,
accessed March 1, 2017, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia39124439; Schmitt, “ISIS Used Chemical Arms”; W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees
(1984),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000); W. Seth Carus,
“Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900,”
(Working Paper, February 2001 Revision. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2001), available at:
https://fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/carus.pdf.
14 Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.”
15 Patrick D. Ellis, “Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An
Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures,” Terrorism and Political Violence
26, (2014): 211-225.
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Previous examinations of chemical and biological weapons use cases have
suggested several underlying factors that could indicate openness or intent
of a group to include CBW as part of its arsenal:16
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Little or no concern over public opinion about a group’s tactics or
results
History of violence resulting in high casualties; an escalatory
pattern of violence
Sophistication or innovation in weapons or tactics
Willingness to take risks
Charismatic leadership
Sense of paranoia and grandiosity
Defensive aggression
Ideology supporting use of unconventional weapons or tactics to
accomplish group goals (apocalyptic, religious).

Because previous work did not provide an organizing framework for the
factors nor analyze comparable groups that did not attempt to acquire or
use CBW, these factors have unknown diagnostic use for distinguishing
between groups inclined or not inclined toward use of CBW. For example,
charismatic leadership is often a valued characteristic in non-terrorist
groups and organizations. Additionally, personal attributes, such as
charismatic leadership or paranoia and grandiosity, are difficult to identify
correctly without specialized training, a broad range of data from extended
observations or measurement, or both.17 Moreover, individuals may
express the same attribute in several ways. Paranoid individuals, for
example, can be stubborn and argumentative or aloof and withdrawn. An
organizing framework should improve identification of intent to acquire
and use CBW.

Reviews include a 1994 study of incidents of CBW terrorism in 26 countries since
World War I (Harvey J. McGeorge, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Analyzing
the Problem,” The ASA [Applied Science & Analysis] Newsletter 42 (1994): 1, 13-4).
(As cited in M. Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the
United States,” White Paper prepared for the Conference on Emerging Threats
Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH. pp. 7-9. 2000), available at:
http://www.equipped.org/bioterror_leitenberg.htm, in-depth historical case studies
of 12 groups or individuals who sought to acquire or used CBW agents between 1945
and 1998; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” in Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B.
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), and a comprehensive survey of all
known instances of bioterrorism incidents between 1900 and 1990; Carus,
“Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.”
17 David C. Funder, “Personality,” Annual Review of Psychology 52 (2001): 197-221,
available at:
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.197.
16
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Development of the Model
Development of the CBW Intent Model relied on research on terrorism
and violence, case studies, reviews of known and suspected use cases, and
scientific models of behavior and intent. Reviews of research on terrorism,
political and criminal violence, the ideology and dynamics of terrorist
groups, radicalization, and group organizational processes that support
terrorist operations provided a foundation for understanding the
motivations of individuals and groups, and the circumstances associated
with terrorism and with attempted and actual use of CBW.18
Two theories from social and organizational psychology–the Theory of
Planned Behavior and Expectancy Theory–inform the model.19 These
theories hold that choice among behavioral alternatives–such as use of
violence and type of weapons–is influenced by beliefs related to available
behavioral alternatives and the expected consequences of attempting and
executing the behaviors.20
Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck; McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” 473507; Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context”; Maya Beasley,
“Terrorism as Social Movement Tactic Theory, Mobilization” in Protecting the
Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current MultiDisciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for
Counter-Radicalization and Disengagement, Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in
Support of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-WMD, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al.
(Wright-Patterson AFB, USA: Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory,
2010); Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4
(1981): 379-99; Murat Ozer, “The Impact of Group Dynamics on Terrorist Decision
Making,” in Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological
Aspects (Amsterdam Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007); Benjamin Ginsberg, “Why
Violence Works,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (2013); John Horgan,
“Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?,” University of Maryland September
28, 2012, available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-endradicalization; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Individual and Group
Mechanisms of Radicalization,” in Protecting the Homeland from International and
Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root
Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-Radicalization and
Disengagement, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. (Wright-Patterson AFB, USA:
Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2010); Gordon H. McCormick and
Guillermo Owen, “Security and Coordination in a Clandestine Organization,”
Mathematical and Computer Modelling 31, no. 6 (2000): 175-92; Marc Sageman,
“Small Group Dynamics,” in Protecting the Homeland from International and
Domestic Terrorism Threats, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. (Wright-Patterson
AFB, USA: Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2010).
19 Icek Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes 50, no. 2 (1991): 179-211; Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein,
“Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of Empirical
Research,” Psychological Bulletin 84, no. 5 (1977): 888-918; Victor H. Vroom, Work
and Motivation (New York, NY: Wiley, 1964).
20 The definition of rationality varies across different disciplines. The most common
definition is from economics and arises from the Theory of Rational Choice which
holds that individuals make choices that maximize utility without the constraints of
time or effort (Howard Rachlin, “Rational Thought and Rational Behavior: A Review
of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox,” Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior 79, no. 3 (2003): 409-12). Bounded rationality was proposed to
account for the frequent observation that humans often rely on heuristics to satisfice
rather than maximize utility given constraints on time and effort (Herbert A. Simon,
18
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In the Theory of Planned Behavior intention is the immediate precursor of
behavior, and intention follows from “beliefs about [a] behavior’s likely
consequences (perceived outcomes), about normative expectations of
important others (social/group norms), and about the presence of factors
that control behavioral performance (moderating factors).”21 In
Expectancy Theory, behavior follows from the expectation of reward
associated with choices among alternatives.22 Intent to perform a specific
behavior is based on the expectancy (belief) that a level of effort will lead
to the intended performance (perceived capability), the perceived
instrumentality of the performance to achieve a desired outcome
(instrumental to the desired end), and the desirability of the outcome (end
state value). These principal components of the two theories are, in turn,
affected by background factors such as overarching beliefs, values or goals,
individual characteristics such as intelligence, religion, experience,
culture, knowledge, and external factors such as opportunity and
resources.
The CBW Intent Model builds upon the principal components and
background factors that comprise the Theory of Planned Behavior and
Expectancy. It proposes that the intent of non-state actors to use violence,
commit terrorist acts, and employ specific tactics and weapons is a choice
among behavioral alternatives.22 The choice can have a rational basis—to
achieve an objective—or can represent a means of self-expression.23 Once
“Rational choice and the structure of environments,” Psychological Review 63
(1956): 129-138.) The use of rationality in the discussion here comes from
psychological science which defines a rational decision as a deliberative or planned
versus emotional one based on perceptions or beliefs versus “facts.” (Ajzen, “The
Theory of Planned Behavior,” 179-211; see also Arie W. Kruglanski, “The Psychology
or Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,” Paper presented at the NATO
Advanced Research Workshop on Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of
Terrorism, Castelvecchio, Pascoli, Italy, September 14-18, 2005), and which
corresponds to the notion of bounded rationality. Both disciplines recognize that
decisions based on cognitive effort may not necessarily be, or appear, logical.
21 Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” 438.
22 McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,”473-507.
23 A similar distinction between terrorism as an emotional or a rational behavior was
discussed by Arie W. Kruglanski in “The Psychology or Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus
‘Tool’ Perspectives.” From a psychological analysis, terrorism can be viewed within a
medical (disease) model as a “syndrome” with internal causes—such as personality
traits that predispose an individual to become a terrorist—and external causes, such
as disadvantaged status of one’s ethnic, religious or other group or political
oppression. It can also be viewed as a “tool,” one of several means by which to achieve
a goal. The model presented in this article deals primarily with rational decisions to
use violence and CB weapons to achieve objectives rather than the factors underlying
violence as a form of self-expression. There is evidence that the motivation of some
al-Qaeda operatives to attack the United States and the West is based in Islamist
ideology, which directs adherents to wage jihad against takfir (nonbelievers and nonMuslim governments) (Erick Stakelbeck, The Terrorist Next Door: How the
Government Is Deceiving You About the Islamist Threat (New York, NY: Regnery
Publishing, 2011)). However, a more in-depth exploration of the psychological factors
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the decision to engage in violence is made, options exist regarding how
actors express the violence.24 Individual, social, and political factors—
including those represented in the Theory of Planned Behavior and
Expectancy Theory—social interaction processes, and available resources
(human, financial, logistical) influence and shape the options selected.25
The CBW Intent Model incorporates individual influence through group
leaders, group dynamics, organizational processes, opportunity, and
openness to novel ideas and technology.26 Knowledge of common factors
underlying behavioral choices and terrorist behavior should improve
identification of factors unique to the propensity to use violence and
unconventional weapons such as CBW. It should also signal when there is
increased risk of a non-violent group becoming violent and opting for
CBW.
Radicalization is often a key antecedent of terrorism.27 However, while
extreme beliefs may precede violent behavior, not all who hold radical or

related to violent behavior as self-expression is beyond the current scope of this work.
McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” 473-507.
24 Ginsberg, “Why Violence Works”; Gary A. Ackerman, Victor Asal, and R. Karl
Rethemeyer, “Toxic Connections: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of
Unconventional Weapons,” in START Research Review 2009, eds. Gary A. Ackerman
and Matthew Rhodes (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2012.648156.
25 Luis de la Corte, “Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach,” Perspectives on
Terrorism 1, no. 2 (2010), available at:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/8/html.
26 Daniel C. Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms,”
Academy of Management Review 9, no. 1 (1984): 47-53, available at: doi:
10.5465/AMR.1984.4277934; Verlin B. Hinsz and James H. Davis, “Persuasive
Arguments Theory, Group Polarization, and Choice Shifts,” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 10, no. 2 (1984): 260-8, available at:
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146167284102012; Irving L. Janis
and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and
Commitment (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1977); Serge Moscovici and Marisa
Zavalloni, “The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 12, no. 2 (1969): 125; Wendy Wood, “Attitude Change: Persuasion and
Social Influence,” Annual Review of Psychology 51, no. 1 (2000): 539-70, available
at: http://www3.psych.purdue.edu/~willia55/392F-'06/Wood-Influence.pdf;
Renate Mayntz, “Organizational Forms of Terrorism: Hierarchy, Network, or a Type
Sui Generis?” MPIfG Discussion Paper [Electronic], (2004), available at:
http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/faces/viewItemOverviewPage.jsp?itemId=es
cidoc:1234217; Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York, NY:
Harper & Row, 1973).
27 Randy Borum, “Understanding the Terrorist Mindset,” FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin 72(2003): 7-10, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=mhlp_f
acpub. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political
Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20,
no. 3 (2008): 415-33, available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550802073367.
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extremist beliefs will engage in violent behavior or terrorism.28 The CBW
Intent Model does not explicitly include radicalization as a factor, but
incorporates several key factors identified as contributing to or indicative
of radicalization toward violence.
Antecedents common to radicalization and terrorism include humiliation
of self or one’s group, a personal connection to a grievance, perceived
injustice toward the group one identifies with, and dissatisfaction with the
status quo of political activism.29

Overview of the CBW Intent Model
The CBW Intent Model is divided into two sections to distinguish between
factors related to intent to use violence (general violence) and factors
related to using CB agents or weapons to commit violence (CB violence).
Just as not all non-violent groups will become violent, not all violent
groups will choose WMD, and specifically CBW, to commit violent acts.
However, all groups that use CBW have opted for violence to reach their
objectives. While analysts may be less concerned about a previously nonviolent group moving toward violence, they need to distinguish groups
moving toward violence using CBW from groups opting for conventional
weapons.
Figure 1 shows the composite and individual factors or indicators in the
model as they relate to individual, group, and organizational processes,
and external influences on the decisions of a group to use violence and
specifically CB violence. It also shows the connection between model
indicators and the Theory of Planned Behavior and Expectancy Theory.30
None of the composite and individual indicators alone is likely to confirm
CBW intent. However, observation over time of multiple indicators that
are consistent with the components of the Theory of Planned Behavior or
Expectancy Theory and the CBW Intent Model may signal increased risk
for a group to choose violent behavior to achieve its objectives and CBW as
the means.

John Horgan, “Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?”; Clark McCauley and
Sophia Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids
Model,” American Psychologist 72, no.3 (2017): 205-216, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000062.
29 Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis,” Social
Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (2009): 1-44, available at: doi: 10.1111/j.17512409.2009.01009.x; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Individual and Group Mechanisms
of Radicalization”; Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review
of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2011): 7-36, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss;
James Spitaletta, Countering Terrorism, Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (WrightPatterson AFB, USA: Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2013).
30 Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” 179-211.
28
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Indicators were selected using a structured process. The initial set of
indicators came from CB cases, relevant social science literature, and
literature on terrorism and violent extremism.31 The strength of support
for each indicator, its connection to violence or CB violence, and its
similarity to other indicators determined the indicator’s retention or
deletion.

Figure 1: Composite and individual indicators and their relationship to
components of the theory of planned behavior and expectancy theory32

Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes”; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Toxic Terror: Assessing
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000); Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis,” in The
Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, ed. by Jerrold M Post (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 2002) 178-212, available at:
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/45062814/_Jerrold_M._Pos
t__The_Psychological_Assessment_of_Political_Leaders_1.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=
AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1505284601&Signature=bKr6NAf390K%2B
0b29tfbPJ6DlSL8%3D&response-contentdisposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DTHE_PSYCHOLOGICAL_ASSESSMENT_O
F_POLITICA.pdf; Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, “New directions in goalsetting theory,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 15 (15): 265-68, 2006;
McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making”; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko.
Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011); Sageman, “Small Group Dynamics,” 128-37; Ehud Sprinzak,
“From Theory to Practice: Developing Early Warning Indicators for Terrorism”
(Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1998).
32 Figure created by the authors.
31
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General Violence consists of five composite indicators (Leadership
Influence, Risk/Benefit Assessment of Violence, Intra-Group Dynamics,
Inter-Group Dynamics, and Organizational Processes) and two individual
indicators (Aggression Toward the Target Group and Psychological
Progression toward Violence).
The three individual indicators indicative of a Tendency toward Violence
using CBW are Social Frames Support Use of CB Weapons, Opportunity to
Acquire or Use CB Weapons, and Ideology, Values and Goals Support Use
of CB Weapons. Although each of these three indicators could be
associated with conventional and other unconventional weapons, only
CBW-specific instantiations constitute relevant signals of an interest in
CBW.
The following section describes the indicators associated with general
violence and CB violence and the behavioral, organizational, and political
constructs supporting each factor. Examples illustrate how the constructs
have been observed in or discussed regarding specific, violent groups. A
small number of examples are about violent criminal organizations. There
are commonalties across violent groups, whether terrorists, gangs, or
criminal groups and more is known about the intra-group dynamics of
gangs and criminal groups than of terrorist groups. Recognized differences
include the importance of ideology and political objectives to terrorist
groups and the financial motives attributed to most gangs and criminal
groups.33

General Violence
Groups that have decided to use CBW have already opted for violence as a
means to achieve their goals. Hence, the indicators associated with a
tendency to engage in violence are necessary, but not sufficient,
preconditions for CB violence. It is important to acknowledge that prior
acts of violence may not precede the use of CBW and the decision to use
violence may occur close in time with the choice of method, especially if
serendipity favors a particular method. However, for large-scale attacks,
complex operations, or difficult to acquire weapons or technologies, some
amount of planning, procuring, and testing prior to an attack would
improve the likelihood of success. These pre-attack activities may produce
observable signatures of intended violence and the type of violence likely
to occur. The composite indicators related to general violence have been
associated with group and organizational characteristics, processes, and
functioning in general, and with the operations of terrorist, criminal, or
Scott Decker and David Pyrooz, “Gangs, Terrorism, and Radicalization,” Journal of
Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 151, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=jss.
33
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political groups that have attempted to achieve their goals through
violence.

Leadership Influence: Leadership Influences Group toward Use of Violence
This composite indicator reflects the intentional efforts by influential
group members to move the group toward violence. Leader characteristics,
goals, beliefs, and group interactions collectively reflect leadership
influence on a group. A change in leadership or leadership style may signal
a change in the group’s direction or activities (for example, toward greater
violence). While it may not be possible to assess leadership influence in
emerging groups for which little information exists, the model provides a
framework for data collection.

Leader’s Ability to Impact or Influence Group Members
Attributes that comprise a leader’s cognitive abilities, personality, motives
and values, problem-solving and social skills, and expertise can provide
insights into a leader’s potential influence on a group. Groups led by
authoritarian or totalitarian leaders are more vulnerable to radical action
and violence through polarization and groupthink.34 Among larger
terrorist groups (for example, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]), strategic decisions are typically made by
top leaders and core members while operational decisions are generally
made by the leadership of the group’s individual cells.35 Strong, assertive,
self-confident, and driven leaders who have the trust of the group can
wield considerable influence over the group and its goals.36
EXAMPLES: Shoko Asahara, the leader of the Aum Shinrikyo
group that perpetrated the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway,
was described as having a monopoly on decision making within the
group.37
Leadership within the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the
Lord restricted participation in decision making to core members.38

Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context.”
Mayntz, “Organizational Forms of Terrorism: Hierarchy, Network, or a Type Sui
Generis?”
36 Hermann, “Assessing leadership style,”178-212; David C. McClelland and David H.
Burnham, “Power Is the Great Motivator,” Harvard Business Review 54, no. 2
(1976): 100-10, available at: https://hbr.org/2003/01/power-is-the-great-motivator;
Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1989), available at: http://corenet.org.pk/js/Gary-Yukl-Leadership-inOrganizations.pdf.
37 Nehorayoff, Ash, and Smith, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
Development Efforts,” 35-48; Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995).”
38 Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985).”
34
35
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Leadership Beliefs and Motivations
Over time, the beliefs and goals of influential members will help define the
group’s values and beliefs and provide focus and direction to its
activities.39 For political, insurgent, criminal, or terrorist groups, this may
include influence on decisions about the use of violence and the weapons
and tactics to employ. Research suggests that the decision to pursue
unconventional weapons requires patient leadership, willingness to accept
risk and failures, and a willingness to absorb the associated costs.
EXAMPLE: Osama bin Laden was described as the North Star of
global terrorism influencing both the terrorist organization he
founded and its affiliated groups. His anti-Western Wahhabist
ideology shaped al Qaeda’s strategy to expel US forces from the
Arabian Peninsula.40

Risk/Benefit Assessment of Violence
The belief that the benefits of terrorism outweigh the risks may result from
the perceived instrumentality of terrorism to achieve group ends
compared with the instrumentality of other approaches or because of
unmet psychological needs of group members.41 Indicators in this
composite have been identified as key factors in radicalization toward
violence. They are also interrelated such that the same antecedent factor
may be present for multiple indicators.

Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo of Political Activism
This indicator represents the negative affect associated with the perceived
ineffectiveness of existing means of political activism. Violent conflict may
arise if one or more competing groups perceive they can change the status
quo by fighting or do not believe non-violent means will achieve goals.42
EXAMPLE: The belief that the US government infringes on the
fundamental rights of citizens and supports the creation of a world
government influenced the ideology and violent activities of the

Locke and Latham, “New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory,” 265-8.
Kate Zernike and Michael T. Kaufman, ‘The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism,” New
York Times, May 2, 2011, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/02osama-bin-laden-obituary.html,
accessed February 2, 2017.
41 McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,”473-507; Vroom, Work and Motivation.
42 David E. Cunningham, “Who Gets What in Peace Agreements?” in The Slippery
Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder, ed.
Mark Ansley, I. William Zartman, and Paul Meerts (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
39
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Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.43

Perceived Sense of Threat
Groups may behave aggressively when they perceive threat from another
group, seek vengeance for harm caused by another group, or are in
competition with another group for resources that would ensure their
survival.44 Groups that perceive a high level of threat “are more likely to
pursue high-risk strategies.”45
EXAMPLES: The Turkish government suspended 11,285 teachers
in September 2016 over suspected links to the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) which the government regards as a terrorist
organization.46
The Turkish government shutdown 15 media outlets and arrested
the editor-in-chief and other executives of a secular newspaper who
were accused of committing crimes in support of Kurdish
militants.47
Amnesty international called civilian casualties and widespread use
of 24-hour curfews in Kurdish areas that sometimes lasted for
weeks “collective punishment” of Kurds living in Turkey.48

Personal Connection to Grievances
Personal grievances or close connections to one’s in-group, which has
grievances against another group (an out-group), have been identified as
factors in radicalization.49 In several confirmed cases of biological agent
use since 1900, the perpetrators were individuals seeking retribution or

Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985).”
Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” 260.
45 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context.”
46 Al-Jazeera, “Turkey suspends 11,000 teachers for suspected PKK links,” 2016,
available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/ (Aljazeera English: Doha, Qatar).
47 Constance Letsch, “Turkey shuts 15 media outlets and arrests opposition editor.”
The Guardian (October 31, 2016), available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/30/turkey-shuts-media-outletsterrorist-links-civil-servants-press-freedom, accessed April 26, 2017.
48 Dorian Jones, “Amnesty International Condemns Turkey’s Treatment of Kurds.”
Voice of America News (January 21, 2016), available at:
http://www.voanews.com/a/amnesty-calls-turkeys-campaign-against-kurdscollective-punishment/3155683.html, accessed March 28, 2017; Ceylan Yeginsu,
“Turkey’s campaign Against Kurdish Militants Takes Toll on Civilians.” New York
Times (December 30, 2015), available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/world/europe/turkey-kurdspkk.html?_r=0, accessed March 28, 2017.
49 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and
Us.
43
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punishment for others who they believed had wronged them.50 Grievances
or feelings of exclusion, from opportunities can also be important
recruitment motivators for armed groups.51
EXAMPLES: A survey of Amsterdam Muslims found that some
Muslim youth radicalized because of strong feelings that Muslims
were victims of discrimination.52
Holocaust survivors within Avenging Israel’s Blood (DIN) poisoned
the bread of Nazi prisoners of war to avenge the deaths of millions
of Jews.53

Humiliation and Need for Revenge
Humiliation of a group can contribute to perceived social disparity, a need
for revenge, and potential extremist behavior.54 Kruglanski and his
colleagues cite humiliation by one’s enemy and the desire to reciprocate
the harm caused to oneself or one’s group as motivating forces in
radicalization.55
EXAMPLE: A history of persecution of the Basques by Francisco
Franco led to the creation of the radical Basque organization
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) dedicated to armed actions against
the Spanish government.56

Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.”
Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder, “Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating
Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4
(2011): 63, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1141&context=jss.
52 Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, in Processes of Radicalisation. Why Some
Amsterdam Muslims Become Radicals, eds. I. Weijers and C. Eliarts (University of
Amsterdam, 2006), available at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/75a50bb90e77-4bda-9b77-a240fda72cc8.pdf.
53 Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal, “Avenging Israel’s Blood (1946),” in Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B.
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
54 Sprinzak, “From Theory to Practice”; Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in
Context”; Sprinzak and Zertal, “Avenging Israel’s Blood (1946).”
55 Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Belanger, Anna Sheveland,
Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Psychology of Radicalization
and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” Advances
in Political Psychology 35 Suppl 1 (2014): 69-93, available at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12163/abstract.
56 Isambard Wilkinson, “Basque Terrorists Driven by Their Hatred of Franco,” The
Telegraph March 23, 2006, available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/1513769/Basqueterrorists-driven-by-their-hatred-of-Franco.html.
50
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Aggression toward the Target Group
Groups may behave aggressively when they perceive another group
threatens them. Perceptions of extreme threats and aggression from
hostile others may provoke extreme violence in response.57 The intensity
and basis of negative emotions that drive behavior directed toward others
will influence a group’s predisposition toward violence against them.58
EXAMPLE: The Christian Identity movement, whose ideology has
been associated with justification for hate crimes, refers to Jews as
“children of Satan” and blacks as “mud people.”59

Psychological Progression toward Violence
Violence is typically not the primary objective of most political, religious,
ethnic, or ideological groups. Rather, a group’s acceptance of violence to
achieve goals may develop over time and after unsuccessful attempts using
non-violent means. Once people believe violence is an acceptable action,
the form that violence takes becomes a matter of choice, resources,
capabilities, and opportunity, among other factors.
EXAMPLES: In 1960, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee [later named Student National Coordinating Committee
(SNCC)] staged non-violent student sit-ins as part of the southern
civil rights movement. By 1963, SNCC criticized the lack of progress
in civil rights for blacks and demanded immediate reforms. By
1966, group leadership called for confrontation with whites.60

Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi, and Gunaratna, “The
Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization”; Tucker, “Lessons from the Case
Studies,” 260.
58 Silvan S. Tomkins, “Affect, Imagery, and Consciousness,” in The Positive Effects,
vol. 1 (New York, NY: Springer, 1962), available at:
http://testrain.info/download/Silvan%20S.%20Tomkins%20PhD%20Affect%20Im
agery%20Consciousness%20The%20Complete%20Edition%20v.%201%20%20v.4%202008.pdf; David Matsumoto, “The Role of Emotion in Escalating Violent
Non-State Actors to Hostility,” in Protecting the Homeland from International and
Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root
Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-Radicalization and
Disengagement, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. (Wright-Patterson AFB, USA: MultiAgency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2010).
59 Anti-Defamation League, “Christian Identity,” in Extremism in America, no date.
http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/christian_identity.html, accessed March 2016;
Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985)”; Tucker, “Lessons
from the Case Studies,” 260.
60 Stanford University, “Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),” in
King Encyclopedia, available at:
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_student_nonv
iolent_coordinating_committee_sncc/, accessed July 2015.
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In its early years, Boko Haram created religious schools to
propagate the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and establish
an Islamic state in Nigeria. Some sources attribute its radicalization
and militancy as a response to the government’s harsh suppression
of protests and escalating clashes between the police and army and
Boko Haram.61

Intra-Group Dynamics
Intra-group dynamics refers to the behavior and formal and informal
processes within a group that influence its structure and functioning. It
represents the patterns of stability and change that affect the group’s
ability to survive and operate effectively. Important processes resulting
from intra-group dynamics include the norms that influence member
behavior, group cohesiveness, decision making, and group direction
usually in the form of group leadership.62 Intra-group dynamics that
support violence are observed in ongoing behavior and activities (for
example, whom a group recruits and training provided members) or a
change in behavior and activity such as increasingly violent rhetoric or
tactics.

Group Norms Support Violence
All groups require mechanisms such as structure and assigned or assumed
roles to guide or control member behavior, maintain order, and protect
group integrity and survival. Groups create and enforce norms for
behaviors that are important to the group and to maintain internal
cohesion and the group’s relationships with other entities.63 Norms also
help define expected and acceptable behaviors of group members. Cultural
and religious norms in particular can facilitate effective group functioning
as they define and reinforce acceptable behaviors for group members and
express to others what the group believes.64

Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign
Relations 7, no. 10 (2014): 2014, available at: http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/bokoharam/p25739.
62 Holly Arrow, Joseph E. McGrath, and Jennifer L. Berdahl, “Small Groups as
Complex Systems: Formation, Coordination, Development, and Adaptation”
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000); Kurt Lewin, “Field Theory in Social
Science: Selected Theoretical Papers” (London, UK: Tavistock Publications, 1952);
Irving L. Janis, Groupthink 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
63 Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior 3rd
ed. (New York, NY: McGraw, 1981); Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of
Group Norms.”
64 Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms.”
61
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EXAMPLE: Justification provided by groups such as ISIS for their
violent actions supports both personal and social acceptance of
violence as rightful.65

In-Group Bias
In-group bias may result when a group’s ideology shapes perceptions of
others as similar to the group (us or in-group) or dissimilar (them or outgroup) and helps establish and maintain positive self-image and identity.
It is evident when one’s group takes precedence over others and makes
decisions favor of one’s in-group.66 In-group bias may support justification
for violence against others (for example, enemies seen as the cause of
problems).67
EXAMPLE: British Muslims recruited by ISIS to fight in Syria
believe they will be treated as equals, but often find they and other
foreign fighters are disproportionately used as suicide bombers.68

Closed versus Open Group
When applied to social groups, the words open and closed refer to the
permeability of group boundaries and consequent interactions with nongroup members. Open groups have permeable boundaries and few
constraints on interactions with outsiders. Closed groups have generally
impermeable boundaries and little interaction with outsiders, and are
susceptible to groupthink.69 Relatively open groups that become highly
restrictive about group membership and outside interactions may signal
increased concern with secrecy concerning group operations. Physical or
social isolation that insulates a group from societal norms and from notice
by authorities can lead to reduced concerns about retribution or alienating
supporters.70

Emin Dashkin, “Justification of violence by terrorist organizations: Comparing ISIS
and PKK,” Journal of Intelligence and Terrorism Studies 1 (2016), available at:
https://doi.org/10.22261/PLV6PE (http://www.veruscript.com/a/PLV6PE/).
66 Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style”; Syracuse, NY: Social Science Automation,
Inc. (1999); Ackerman, Asal, and Rethemeyer, “Toxic Connections.”
67 Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 02
(2008): 437-49.
68 Robert Verkaik and John Hall, “Is ISIS running out of suicide bombers? Terror
group suffers shortage of martyrs after dozens of fighters desert or defect to rival
militias,” The Daily Mail, (February 9, 2015), available at:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2945724/ISIS-experiencing-shortagesuicide-bombers-dozens-fighters-desert-terror-group-defect-rival-militias.html.
69 Gordon Marshall, “Closed Groups and Open Groups,” in A Dictionary of Sociology
(Encyclopedia.com, 1988), available at: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88closedgroupsandopengroups.html; Ibid; Janis, Groupthink 2nd ed.
70 Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies.”
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EXAMPLE: The Rajneeshees, a religious cult that poisoned citizens
in a small Oregon county to influence local elections, controlled
member interactions with outside others and exercised strict
control over access to their ranch.71

Radical Subgroups Form within a Larger Group
Similar characteristics, common interests or backgrounds, and shared
goals or beliefs are often the basis for subgroup formation. Group leaders
may create subgroups to perform activities that would otherwise put the
entire group at risk (for example, a militant subgroup may be responsible
for handling threats to the larger group) or perform functions that require
specialized capabilities or expertise such as skunkworks to test weapons
technologies or a research and development (R&D) function to develop
new weapons or tactics. Regardless of how they form, subgroups can
create fault lines and lead to splintering from the larger group.72
EXAMPLES: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were
militant splinter groups from the Muslim Brotherhood.73
The Communist Party of India-Maoist emerged from the
splintering of several factions of the Leftist movement in India to
become one of the country’s strongest insurgent groups.74
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) created and
maintained its “Engineering Department” for weapons R&D.75

Polarization and Choice Shift
Pressure toward uniformity in highly cohesive groups may lead to
oversimplification of the decision-making process, intolerance of dissent,
and increased vulnerability to polarization. Group polarization can

Carus, “The Rajneeshees.”
Katerina Bezrukova, “Understanding and Addressing Faultlines” (Paper presented
at the Presented at Workshop on Science Team Dynamics and Effectiveness, The
National Research Council, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2013), available at:
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/dbassesite/documents/webpage/dbass
e_083763.pdf; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Individual and Group Mechanisms of
Radicalization.”
73 US Department of State, “Terrorist Groups,” in Terrorist Groups, (Washington,
D.C.: US Department of State, no date), available at:
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf.
74 Akanksha Mehta, “Surge in the Red Tide: India’s Maoist Insurgency,” Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Journal of the International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research 2 (2010): 1-4.
75 Gary A. Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development
of Mortars,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 12-34, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1501&context=jss.
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contribute to “extremism, ‘radicalization,’ [and] cultural shifts.”76
Polarization may occur under several conditions: authoritarian leadership,
high group cohesion, suspicion of outsiders and outside ideas, time
pressures to decide on a course of action, few checks on internal power,
hierarchical decision-making structure, a culture and norms supporting
consensus and discouraging divergent opinions, and support from
constituents for more radical activity or positions.77
A choice shift is evident when the final opinion or position of the group is
different––more positive or negative—from members’ initial positions (for
example, a historically non-violent group promotes violent means to
achieve objectives).78 Polarization occurs when the shift is in the same
direction as members’ initial positions—initial positive (or negative)
positions are more positive (or negative).79 Polarization would be evident
when a group tending toward violence becomes supportive and accepting
of violence. Both types of shifts could signal a progression toward violence.
Deliberations of groups that progress toward violence are difficult to
observe. Consequently, it is difficult to track changes from initial stating
opinions or positions. However, several of the groups cited throughout this
document appear to have operated under conditions conducive to
polarization and choice shift.
EXAMPLE: Decision making in Aum Shinrikyo and the
Rajneeshees was completely under the control of the group’s
authoritarian leaders’ hierarchical decision-making structure. Both
were closed groups that restricted or controlled contact with
outsiders, members were generally confined within the group’s
compound, and leaders experienced time pressures to achieve
objectives.

Group Experience with Violence
A “group’s collective experience with violence” may emerge from prior
involvement of group leaders and members in violent activities and
Cass R. Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization,” in John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 91 (2nd Series) (Chicago, IL: The Law School of The
University of Chicago, 1999), 1; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Individual and Group
Mechanisms of Radicalization”.
77 Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism”; Jerrold M
Post, “Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Motivations
and Constraints,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 8, no. 3 (2002):
187, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327949PAC0803_02.
78 Noah E. Friedkin, “Choice Shift and Group Polarization,” American Sociological
Review (1999): 856-75.
79 Andrew K. Semmel and Dean A. Minix, “Small-Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy
Decision-Making,” in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S.
Falkowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).
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recruitment of individuals experienced in violence.80 Violent behavior may
become the dominant response to a situation if the violence consistently
leads to desired outcomes.81
EXAMPLE: The Real IRA (Irish Republican Army) actively
recruited disaffected members from the original IRA who rejected
the Good Friday accords and the peace process.82

Inter-Group Dynamics
Underlying all organizational networks are ties that connect network
members. These may be formal, instrumental ties for mutual benefit such
as leveraging resources or capabilities or informal ties based on shared
beliefs, values, interests, or personal relationships. Network connections
enable information sharing that would otherwise be difficult to obtain,
including innovations in weapons, technology, and tactics.83
Criminal organizations have historically relied on networks such as family
and tribal or community relationships to facilitate their illicit activities.
Criminal groups also develop relationships and marry strategically to gain
entry into advantageous groups, networks, and locations to which they
might otherwise not have access.84 Terrorist and violent extremist
organizations rely on networks to facilitate their missions.85

Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context.”
Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (Simon and Schuster,
1953);
JER Staddon and D.T. Cerutti, “Operant Conditioning,” Annual Review of
Psychology 54 (2003): 115.
82Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development of
Mortars,” 12-34.
83 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwar: The Future of Terror,
Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), available at:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html.
84 Mary D Zalesny, “Networking and the Legitimization of Transnational Crime
Organizations,” in The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A
Geopolitical Perspective and Implications for US National Security, Strategic MultiLayer Assessment Occasional Paper (2013); Ed Reina, Vince Garcia, and Isodro
Lopez, Personal Communication April 28, 2010. Source: Ed Reina (Director of Public
Safety; Joseph Delgado, Chief of Police, Tohono O’odham Nation Tribal Police), Vince
Garcia (Tohono O’odham Nation Tribal Police), Isodro Lopez (Vice Chairman,
Tohono O’odham Nation); Andrew Thomas, Tina Sunday, and Dennis O’Neal,
Personal Communication December 15, 2009. Source: Andrew Thomas (Chief of
Police, St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police), Tina Sunday (Lieutenant and Intelligence
Officer, St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police), Dennis O’Neal (US Border Patrol, Massena
NY Station, previously on SW US border).
85 Tricia Bacon, Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape,
8 (2014): 4-26, available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap113B-sec2332a.pdf.
80
81

74
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 3

Alliances/Partnerships
Alliances or partnerships can vary in duration (from short-term tactical or
transactional alliances to long-term mergers or strategic alliances), extent
of alliance member interdependence, range and variety of activities,
ideological similarity, and expected level of trust between members.
Bay’ah, or pledge of allegiance to a group’s leader by another group, is an
example of a high-level connection that may lead to a formal merger.86
Lower level relationships include instrumental tactical and transactional
alliances, which tend to maintain each group’s independence, involve
limited activities, and not require a shared ideology or high level of trust.87
Most alliances or partnerships are intentional–or at least convenient–as
when groups establish a network to leverage resources or share
information.88 Alliance hubs, which are closely-knit clusters of cooperating
organizations, are vehicles for organizational learning and dissemination
of innovations among the hub members.89 For example, dissemination of
knowledge can occur through demonstration effects by a network member
currently using new weapons technology.90 Weaker alliance partners may
adopt the stronger partner’s tactics to improve their effectiveness and
range. They may also assume a specialized role that benefits all alliance
members (for example, establishing an R&D program or experimenting
with new tactics and weapons such as CBW).
EXAMPLE: When the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
allied with al Qaeda in 2006 (becoming al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb or AQIM), it adopted al Qaeda’s tactic of suicide
operations and focused on the high profile targets al Qaeda
attacked.91

Rivalries
Rivalries may emerge because of conflicting beliefs, values, or tactics, or
competition for influence over a population or area (for example,
competition among the mujahidin groups in post-Soviet occupation

Jacob Zenn, “A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay’a to Al-Baghdadi,” CTC
Sentinel 8 (2015): 17-21, available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-biography-ofboko-haram-and-the-baya-to-al-baghdadi.
87 Defense Intelligence Agency, Human Factors Analysis Center. “Dynamic Group
Assessment Methodology.” July 2009.
88 Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism”; Post,
“Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” 187.
89 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle
against Israel (New York, NY: Random House, 2011).
90 Letsch, “Turkey shuts 15 media outlets and arrests opposition editor.”
91 Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism.”
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Afghanistan).92 They may also contribute to radicalization of each groups’
members.93 Previously non-violent groups may engage in violence and
violent groups may explore new tactics or weapons to stand out from their
rivals.
EXAMPLE: ISIS propaganda has described rival Islamist groups or
anti-ISIS groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and the al Qaida/Nusra
Front as apostates and traitors linked to Iraqi Sunni tribal
opposition to the Islamic State in Iraq.94

Organizational Processes
Violent groups and terrorist groups must perform tasks necessary for
group maintenance, support, survival, and growth.95 In addition to
attracting and recruiting members, groups must also socialize, train, and
retain members, and organize to accomplish its objectives.96 For example,
ISIS has specialized functions to oversee finance, security, media, and
recruitment operations.97

Staffing and Maintaining the Organization
In addition to recruiting, groups must retain current members who
contribute operational expertise, training, capabilities, and understanding
of norms and standard operating procedures. A shift in a group’s
recruitment, training, socialization, and operational tactics may indicate
new objectives and an increased risk of violence if the change is consistent
with support for violent activities.98 The rise in status of group members
involved in violent attacks may communicate within and outside the group
that violence is acceptable and is a means to advancement in leadership
ranks.
Sprinzak, “From Theory to Practice”; Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of
International Terrorism.”
93 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” 415-33.
94 Alberto M. Fernandez, “Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda
networks,” The Brookings Project on United States Relations with the Islamic World,
United States-Islamic World Forum Papers (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C)
October 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/research/here-to-stay-and-growingcombating-isis-propaganda-networks/.
95 Jeyong Jung and Julak Lee, “Organizational Behavior of Terrorist Groups,” Journal
of Public Administration and Governance 5, no. 2 (2015): 62-77, available at:
https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v5i2.7551.
96 Marshall, “Closed Groups and Open Groups.”
97 Gregor Aisch, Joe Burgess, C. J. Chivers, Alicia Parlapiano, Sergio Peçanha, Archie
Tse, Derek Watkins, and Karen Yourish. “How ISIS Works.” New York Times,
September 16, 2014.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isisworks.html; Armin Rosen, “ISIS is Running an Alarmingly Effective Terrorist State.”
available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-isis-caliphate-operates2014-12.
98 Ibid, 90.
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EXAMPLE: Aum Shinrikyo recruited PhD-level microbiologists
and chemists before the group moved toward chemical/biological
terrorism.99

Member Characteristics
To achieve its objectives, a group must recruit individuals with capabilities
commensurate with task requirements or train them. For groups with an
interest in or intention to use violence or CBW, attractive recruits will have
experience with violence and capabilities and experience related to the
weapons and tactics the group wishes to employ (for example, expertise in
explosives, chemistry, biology/microbiology, chemical engineering,
information technology). Groups may present themselves as legitimate
support organizations to build connections with individuals who are
vulnerable (for example, because of characteristics or circumstance) and
more likely to succumb to persuasion.100 Vulnerable individuals may also
seek out groups for the opportunity to affiliate with peers or individuals
with whom they self-identify.101
EXAMPLES: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s recruiting strategy
targets characteristics specific to its operational needs. For suicide
bombing, it targets the homeless, disabled, young, and frustrated
refugees.102 For less expendable and necessary positions, it recruits
professionals and university students such as journalists for
propaganda work and engineers to run captured industries.103
Richard Reid, recruited by al Qaeda to bring down a US airline
flight using explosives hidden in his shoes, was described as
impressionable by the imam at the mosque Reid attended in the
UK.104

Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995).”
Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalization:
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101 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
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G. Austin (Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986).
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103 Yusuf Huma, “University Radicalization: Pakistan’s Next Counterterrorism
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Recruits in Pakistan,” in ISIS Courts White-Collar Recruits in Pakistan, (New York:
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Socialization
Groups may socialize individuals to radical ideologies that facilitate
recruitment through social interactions involving family, friends, and
others important to the individual who support those ideologies.105 Once
joining a group, new members may undergo secondary socialization to
familiarize them with the group’s culture, functioning, and structure.106
EXAMPLES: Almost one-quarter of the members of the Italian Red
Brigades and one-third of the 9/11 hijackers were related.107
Extreme approaches to socialization include the conscription of
children to become child soldiers in South Sudan and the
kidnapping and impregnation of women by the Shining Path to
socialize future soldiers from birth.108

Training
Unless a group recruits experienced individuals, some training will be
required to prepare new group members for various operations. A change
in group strategy from non-violence to violence will require internal or
external training in how to destroy property and facilities and how to
injure and kill people.109
EXAMPLE: Hezbollah is known for its sophisticated military
training camps, which include firing ranges, assault courses, and
urban warfare sites. The camps provide both basic and advanced
skills training for recruits and existing members.110

Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Ties that Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds,”
CTC Sentinel 9 (2016): 15-7, available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-ties-thatbind-how-terrorists-exploit-family-bonds.
106 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context,” 91-92.
107 Donatella Della Porta, “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy,” in Terrorism in Context, ed.
Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
108 Tom Burridge, “Child Soldiers Still Being Recruited in South Sudan,” in World
|Africa (London: BBC News, October 27, 2014) available at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29762263; Jenny Stanton, “Rescued after
Decades in Captivity: Slaves Held in Shining Path ‘Troop-Making Camps’ in Peru
Where Women Were Raped to Produce Future Soldiers Are Finally Freed” (London:
The Daily Mail, July 29, 2015), available at:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3178355/Rescued-decades-captivitySlaves-held-Shining-Path-troop-making-camps-Peru-women-raped-produce-futuresoldiers-finally-freed.html.
109 Brian A. Jackson et al., “Aptitude for Destruction,” in Case Studies in
Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups, vol. 2 (Santa Monica CA: RAND
Corporation, 2005), available at:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332.readonline.html.
110 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God; Nicholas Blanford, “Look Who’s Training:
Hezbollah Prepares for War,” Christian Science Monitor, December 4, 2013, available
at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/1204/Look-who-s105
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Innovation in Weapons and Tactics; Willingness to Take Risks
Group leadership is a key factor in a group’s exploration and adoption of
unconventional and innovative weapons and tactics.111 Successful
innovations benefit from leadership that is open to experience and
information, and willing to take risks that may result in failures. Leader
risk taking, however, may be constrained by compatibility of the weapons
system with group ideology and values, the group’s acceptance of the
leader’s decision, momentum toward adoption (including sunk costs),
sufficient technical expertise to produce or operate new weapons or
technologies, opportunity, and access to a safe haven in which to
experiment with new weapons or tactics.112
EXAMPLE: The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC)
designed and built submersible and reusable narco submarines to
overcome improved detection and interdiction of fast boats by
authorities.113

Organizational Learning
Organizational knowledge resides in the rules, procedures, conventions,
strategies, and technologies around which organizations are structured
and how they operate.114 It becomes part of collective memory.115
Organizations acquire information through networks, alliances, or
partnerships and intelligent failures that provide important diagnostic
information.116 Learning organizations are well-positioned to innovate.
Conditions that support intelligent failures and organizational learning
include a focus on process, acceptance or legitimization of failure (such as
leadership willing to learn from mistakes and not punish risk taking),
publicizing or acknowledging intelligent failures, training for resilience,
training-Hezbollah-prepares-for-war; Magnus Ranstorp, “The Hezbollah Training
Camps of Lebanon,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root
Causes, vol. 2, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
111 Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck.
112 Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck; Kruglanski, “The Psychology or Terrorism:
‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives”; Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican
Army and the Development of Mortars.”
113 Michelle Jacome Jaramillo, “The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
the Development of Narco-submarines,” Journal of Strategic Security 9 no.1 (2016):
49-69, available at:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1509&context=jss.
114 Barbara Levitt and James G. March, “Organizational Learning,” Annual Review of
Sociology (1988): 319-40, available at:
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.so.14.080188.001535.
115 Bruce Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a
Religious Perspective (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993).
116 Sim B. Sitkin, “Learning through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses,” in
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committing resources to efforts with uncertain outcomes, and
incorporating problem solving into the organization’s philosophy or
ideology.117
EXAMPLE: The Provisional Irish Republican Army has been
described as having a “culture of learning,” which included the preemployment testing of weapons systems, willingness to innovate,
and institutionalization of after-action analyses of successful and
failed bombing attacks (for example, gathering post-attack
information on unexploded ordnance through observers stationed
at police barriers).118

CB Violence
Direct observation of group actions suggestive of interest or intent to use
CBW may be difficult. However, other evidence indicative of intent may be
available. Technical manuals related to chemical and biological agents,
equipment to manufacture chemical or biological agents, or receipts for
the purchase of agents or equipment found at a group’s current or
previous location all reflect at least an interest in chemical or biological
agents. The arrest of a group member in possession of such materials, a
group’s association, partnership with suppliers or users of chemical- or
biological-related materials, or third-party observations or statements
would also constitute evidence of interest or intent. The CBW Intent
Model proposes three indicators as indirect evidence of interest or intent
to acquire or use CBW.

Social Frames Support the Use of CB Weapons
Framing refers to social influence on how individuals perceive or interpret
and react to an object or event.119 Perception of the same event can vary
considerably depending on the frame in which the event is set. For
example, a story about police arresting protesters framed by concerns for
Based on a recently compiled dataset of incidents of failed and foiled (outside
intervention) jihadist attempts since 1993 to attack the United States and its Western
allies, Crenshaw (2016) observed that terrorists may sometimes perceive a failed or
foiled plot as being successful. Although data do not exist on whether failed or foiled
attempts were treated by jihadist groups as intelligent failures and part of
organizational learning, the compiled dataset may contain additional information on
whether and which groups have other characteristics of a learning organization.
Martha Crenshaw, “Failed, Foiled, Completed, and Successful Jihadist Plots in the
United States 1993-2016,” Telephonic presentation to the DHS/START/MINERVA
and SMA Technical Lecture Series, Washington, D.C., May 31, 2016; Stephen Walsh
and Paul Whitney, “A Graphical Approach to Diagnosing the Validity of the
Conditional Independence Assumptions of a Bayesian Network Given Data,” Journal
of Computational and Graphical Statistics 21, no. 4 (2012): 961-78.
118 Ibid, 90.
119 Heidi A. Campbell and Diana Hawk, “Al Jazeera’s Framing of Social Media During
the Arab Spring,” CyberOrient, Journal of the Virtual Middle East 6, no. 1 (2012).
117
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the protest turning violent will be perceived differently (more favorably)
than if the arrests are framed as an example of overly aggressive police
tactics (less favorably).
Social framing by political, insurgent, and terrorist groups can help justify
a group’s ideology or behavior and suggest possible responses to an
event.120 Exposure to internal propaganda, communications from trusted
others, social media, and the internet can tap deeply held beliefs, increase
awareness of alternative weapons, tactics, and techniques, and
communicate direct and subtle messages of acceptable or preferred
weapons to use against enemies.121 Groups may also stage unconventional
activities (for example, ISIS videos of the beheading of hostages) or
employ new technologies to increase media exposure, create propaganda
for use in recruiting or training, or prompt others to emulate their actions.
Social frames used by a group to radicalize others may influence lone wolf
attackers who profess allegiance to a terrorist group.
Within social movements, activists use frames to present themselves and
their ideas to gain the support of others.122 Frames can convince others
that their participation is necessary for change to occur.123 They can also
“highlight specific societal problems and identify the parties guilty of
creating them.”124 Frames involving CBW can demonstrate how to initiate
specific change that solves problems.
EXAMPLE: Islamic imagery on websites has included
combinations of weapons including gas masks to suggest the use or
potential use of chemical or biological weapons to achieve
objectives or in retaliation for use by the adversary (see Figure 2).125
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Figure 2: Social frames can suggest the use of CB weapons126

EXAMPLE: ISIS uses at least two propaganda magazines to recruit
jihadists especially from the West: Rumiyah and Dabiq. Of the two,
Dabiq uses slick photos of heavily armed fighters and exaggerates
claims about the group’s terrorist attacks.127

Opportunity to Acquire or Use CB Weapons
Opportunity represents an important potential situational constraint and
condition affecting intention toward specific behavioral choices.128 It
typically arises as an unsought favorable circumstance–a serendipitous
event. In the context of CBW, opportunity can be a found cache of
chemical or biological weapons or a new group member with specialized
skills, knowledge, or connections.
A group can create near or longer-term opportunity by relocating closer to
an area with a greater variety of resources to leverage. An extremist or
criminal group may also create and then capitalize on the failures of the
state to provide protection or services to the populace.129 According to the
Theory of Planned Behavior, individuals or group members who assess
there are sufficient resources, opportunity, and few obstacles for pursuing
specific behaviors would be more likely to attempt the behaviors.130
Others can create opportunity to stimulate interest in weapons or
technology. Smugglers, organized crime groups, arms dealers, and

Combating Terrorism Center, The Islamic Imagery Project, 98.
David Harris, “The Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine,” Clarion Project,
September 10, 2014, available at: https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isilpropaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/.
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(Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1977); Marcus Felson and Ronald
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98, Police Research Series Paper (London, UK: Research, Development and Statistics
Directorate London, 1998).
129 Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck; Amy Pate, Gary A. Ackerman, and John
Sawyer, Extremist Pathways to Power: From Extremist Ideologies to State Dogma,
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Assessment (College Park, MD: START| DHS, 2013).
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terrorist groups often trade in arms and illegal commodities for profit or to
establish markets as part of their broader operations.131
EXAMPLE: “ISIL is…reportedly interested in acquiring chemical
weapons from old Iraqi sites - two bunkers that still contain a
stockpile of old weapons - which were once Saddam Hussein's
premier chemical weapons production facility.”132

Group Ideology, Values, and Goals Support Use of CB Weapons
Some qualitative terrorism analysis has supported the view that groups
with certain types of ideology are more likely than other groups to engage
in extreme violence or use unconventional weapons.133 Hoffman has
observed that religion may be used to legitimize violence against
opponents.134 Other research, however, suggests that ideology may
contribute much less in predicting whether a particular group may use
WMD and, specifically, CBW.135
Whether and how group ideology, values, and goals is related to the use
and method of violence remains an empirical question which requires a
more granular analysis. Nonetheless, ideology, values, and goals can
provide insights into whether a group presented with an opportunity to
acquire or use CBW would take advantage of it.
A group’s ideology functions partly as an indicant of the group’s identity
(“this is who we are”) and is important for group loyalty, cohesion,
acceptance of group norms, and in the selection of potential allies or
partners.136 Group members who are committed to the group’s ideology
and values may also be more committed to accomplishing the group’s
tasks even if it requires violence.137 Group leaders whose beliefs and values
Helfstein Scott and John Solomon. “Risky Business: The Global Threat Network
and the Politics of Contraband.” Combating Terrorism Center, May 2014, available
at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf.
132 NATO, “Fighting Weapons of Terror,” in Book Fighting Weapons of Terror,
[Electronic article] (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 4,
2015), available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_122272.htm.
133 Post, “Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,”187; Bruce
Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious
Perspective (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993); Bruce Hoffman, Inside
Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998).
134 Hoffman, Holy Terror.
135 Victor Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be
Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 35 (2012): 229-54.
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support the use of CBW in attacks against the group’s targets can affect
member acceptance through the strength of their influence over the group,
through selective rewarding of violent behavior, and with social frames
that support CBW use. However, groups may resist or reject outright
weapons or tactics innovations that are not consistent with a group’s
ideology.138
Because research has not sufficiently addressed the relationship between a
group’s ideology and the use of CBW, this indicator is a topic for future
research. Importantly, the level of analysis must distinguish among the
ideologies of specific groups. The question is not whether groups with
religious ideologies are more likely to use violence or CBW, but rather
what about religious (or other) ideologies will influence a group’s actions.
EXAMPLES: Aum Shinrikyo’s ideology included belief in an
apocalyptic war, which the cult would survive only by arming itself
with “powerful weapons including biological and chemical
agents.”139
The ideologies, values, and beliefs of groups such as al Qaeda, The
Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, Hamas, and
Jemaah al Islamiyah support or are interpreted to support or
justify the use of violence to defend against and defeat perceived
enemies.140

Application and Future Research
The conceptual model of CBW intent described in this article is the basis
for a computational CBW model which analysts can test and apply.141 The
development and evaluation of the computational model is a critical next
step for our research program in CBW. Once in computational form, the
conceptual CBW Intent Model can be empirically evaluated as a statistical
model for the existence and strength of proposed relationships.142 With
Ackerman, “More Bang for the Buck.”
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Southeast Asia” (Conflict Studies Research Centre Discussion Paper), (Shrivenham,
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141 Examples of transitioning a conceptual model into a computational model—such as
a Bayesian network—are presented in Whitney et al. 2011; James L. Regens et al.,
“Probabilistic Graphical Modeling of Terrorism Threat Recognition Using Bayesian
Networks and Monte Carlo Simulation,” Journal of Cognitive Engineering and
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sufficient data, interactions among the identified indicators can also be
evaluated. Formal elicitation from experts leading to quantitative data is
also available to inform the computational model.143
Testing the application of the computational CBW model will use readily
available, processed data, such as those from the University of Maryland
START Center, historical summaries, and news reporting on groups of
interest.144 Because parts of the conceptual model correspond with
activities that occur more frequently than the use of CBW (for example,
general political violence), it is expected that some parts of the model will
be more precisely calibrated than others. Once the computational model
is developed, it can be used for multiple purposes. First is to identify and
prioritize indicators to monitor or track intent to use CBW in groups.
Second, the computational model can be used to quantify the status of
tracked groups on each indicator to determine their risk for violent acts
and use of CBW. Finally, the computational model can be used to track
changes in group status on all indicators to identify change in risk.
Given the potentially large amount of information analysts review daily, it
is impractical to expect anyone to apply the model as part of daily
information review without additional assistance. To that end, the
computational CBW model will be incorporated into a model-based
analysis software system to address both the scale of the data and the
complexity of the model. As information related with CBW intent is
collected, the envisioned computational framework will support
computational evaluations of the CBW model. Questions to address will
include whether there are detectable regional variations in the expression
of CBW intent, and how well the CBW Intent Model–developed
considering non-state actors–captures state actors’ intent regarding use of
violence and CBW. The framework for the conceptual CBW Intent Model
and the approach for developing, testing, and using the computational
(paper presented at Advances in Social Computing: Third International Conference
on Social Computing, Behavioral Modeling, and Prediction (SBP 2010), Bethesda,
MD, March 30-31, 2010).
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model map to other settings. Potential applications include general
political violence, terrorism, and intent of non-state actors to use
radiological and nuclear WMD.
While the model incorporates indicators for the most important factors
related to interest and intent to use CBW, we may test other indicators in
the future to determine their contribution to predicting intent. Future
research should also include model validation using data sets and case
studies of a large number and variety of groups. Ideally, the groups should
vary across factors that can affect group or organizational decisions related
to size, maturity, structure, founding member beliefs and values, primary
objectives for existence, membership, leadership, stakeholder influence,
and geographical location.145
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